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In this article, we derive a unique procedure for quantum state estimation from a simple, self-
evident principle: an experimentalist’s estimate of the quantum state generated by an apparatus
should be constrained by honesty. A skeptical observer should subject the estimate to a test that
guarantees that a self-interested experimentalist will report the true state as accurately as possible.
We also find a non-asymptotic, operational interpretation of the quantum relative entropy function.
Consider a source of quantum states such as a laser,
or an ion trap with a preparation procedure. Quantum
state estimation is the problem of deducing what state
it emits by analyzing the outcomes of measurements on
many instances. The usual procedure for state estimation
is quantum state tomography [1, 2], together with some
variant of maximum-likelihood estimation [3, 4] to ensure
positivity. The obvious goal is an estimate “close” to the
true state. Different metrics, such as fidelity [5], relative
entropy [6], trace norm, or Hilbert-Schmidt norm [7], will
favor different estimation procedures.
Here, we derive an optimal state-estimation procedure
by first identifying quantum relative entropy as a unique
metric for characterizing an estimate’s “goodness”. Our
procedure is broadly adaptable to (1) arbitrary prior
knowledge (or ignorance) and (2) arbitrary measurement
procedures.
Keeping the Experimentalist Honest: Implicit
in the idea of state estimation is the assumption that
some estimates are better than others. Suppose that σ
is an estimate of the true state ρ, and that f(ρ : σ) is
a measure of how “good” an estimate σ is. We propose
that this measure should obey three principles:
1. The best estimate of ρ is ρ itself. If f(ρ : σ) mea-
sures how well σ estimates ρ, then f(ρ : ρ) > f(ρ :
σ) for all σ 6= ρ.
2. f(ρ : σ) should correspond to some operational
test, as the payoff or cost of some experimental pro-
cedure.
3. The “reward” for correctly predicting an event
should depend only on the predicted probability
for that event. This is a version of the likelihood
principle (see [8]).
Remarkably, these simple assumptions single out one
measure: the relative entropy between ρ and σ, or
S (ρ‖σ) = Tr(ρ ln ρ − ρ lnσ). It arises as the expected
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payoff in a type of game between a cash-strapped exper-
imentalist and her employer.
Alice, an ambitious scientist attempting to build a
quantum computer, produces states that she believes are
described by the density operator ρ. She informs her em-
ployer, Bob, that she has produced the state σ. Bob, a
conscientious scientific administrator, would like to en-
sure that Alice does not lie – that σ = ρ. He will period-
ically visit Alice’s lab and measure one of her states, in a
way that may depend on her estimate σ. Her future fund-
ing will depend on the outcomes of these measurements.
What measurement should Bob perform, and how should
he pay Alice, so that she has no incentive to deceive him?
We propose that Bob should measure in a basis
{|fi〉}
n
i=1 that diagonalizes σ =
∑
i si|fi〉〈fi|. Upon get-
ting outcome i, he should pay Alice Ri = C+D ln si dol-
lars, where C and D are non-negative constants. We de-
note this as the “honest experimentalist reward scheme,”
or HERS.
HERS motivates honesty: Bob’s measurement
yields outcome i with probability pi = Tr(ρ|fi〉〈fi|). Al-
ice’s expected reward is
R =
n∑
i=1
piRi = C +D
n∑
i=1
pi ln si. (1)
Rewriting the last term as
∑
i pi ln si = Trρ lnσ yields
R(ρ : σ) = C +DTrρ lnσ
= C +D [Trρ ln ρ− (Trρ ln ρ− Trρ lnσ)]
= C −D [H(ρ) + S (ρ‖σ)] (2)
Since C, D, and ρ are fixed, Alice maximizes her expected
reward by reporting a σ that minimizes the relative en-
tropy S (ρ‖σ). This constrains σ to be ρ itself [9]. Alice
is thereby motivated to be honest. She is also motivated
to produce pure states – but not to lie about how pure
the actual state is.
HERS is unique: Unless Bob can do non-projective
POVMs [31], this turns out to be the only verification
procedure that satisfies our three criteria.
In classical statistics, a reward scheme for a probabilis-
tic forecast is a scoring rule. It assigns an average reward
R(P : Q) to a forecast Q when events are distributed ac-
cording to P . A reward that is uniquely maximized by an
2honest forecast is a strictly proper scoring rule or SPSR
(see review [10]). Given some P , the maximum reward
under such a rule is P ’s value, G(P ) ≡ R(P : P ). Savage
showed that for every SPSR, G(P ) is strictly convex [11].
To consider the quantum case, we observe that a mea-
surement transforms a state ρ into a probability distribu-
tion {Pi} over outcomes, to which we can apply a scoring
rule. We represent a projective measurement of basis B
as a quantum channel β. For any state ρ, let β[ρ] = P . P
is a diagonal matrix of probabilities, and β simply anni-
hilates off-diagonal elements. Let G(ρ) be the maximum
of G(β[ρ]) over all β. Since the eigenvalues of ρ ma-
jorize those of β[ρ] [12], and G is convex, this maximum
is achieved when β[ρ] = ρ. Thus G(ρ) = G({λi}), where
{λi} are the eigenvalues of ρ.
Lemma 1. Given a physical state ρ and an estimate σ,
Bob can ensure Alice’s honesty by applying a SPSR to the
probabilities for a measurement of basis B if and only if
σ is diagonal in B.
Proof : Represent Bob’s σ-dependent measurement as
a CP-map βσ that annihilates off-diagonal elements in
basis B. Let the SPSR yield a value G.
1. Suppose that B diagonalizes σ, so βσ[σ] = σ. Then
Alice’s expected reward is
R(βσ[ρ] : βσ[σ]) ≤ G(βσ[ρ]) ≤ G(ρ). (3)
The inequalities are simultaneously saturated if and only
if σ = ρ, in which case Alice earns the full value G(ρ) of
her state. When σ 6= ρ, one or both of the inequalities is
strict, so Alice earns strictly less than G(ρ). Thus, Alice
maximizes her reward uniquely by reporting σ = ρ.
2. Suppose that there exists a σ so that βσ[σ] 6= σ.
Then let ρ = βσ[σ]. Since β
2
σ = βσ, βσ[ρ] = ρ = βσ[σ].
Alice’s expected reward is
R(βσ[ρ] : βσ[σ]) = R(ρ, ρ) = G(ρ). (4)
whereas if she (truthfully) reports ρ, she can expect
R(βρ[ρ] : βρ[ρ]) = G(βρ[ρ]) ≤ G(ρ), (5)
where the inequality holds because ρ’s eigenvalues ma-
jorize those of βρ[ρ] (by Schur’s theorem [12]), and be-
cause G is convex. Alice expects the same reward for
reporting ρ or σ 6= ρ, so her honesty is not ensured.
So far we have demanded only that our scoring rule
be strictly proper. We now demand that Alice’s reward
depend only on her predicted probability for the observed
event. In other words, Ri({sj}) = Ri(si). This reflects
the Likelihood Principle [13]: all the relevant information
in an event is contained in the likelihood of the hypothesis
(here, p(i|σ)). How the experiment was performed is ir-
relevant. In particular, this avoids any argument between
Alice and Bob about how to describe the outcome[s] that
did not occur.
A remarkable theorem by Aczel (see also [8]) then re-
stricts the form of the reward function Ri(si).
Theorem 1 (Aczel [14]). Let n ≥ 3. The inequality
n∑
i=1
piRi(qi) ≤
n∑
i=1
piRi(pi) (6)
is satisfied for all n-point probability distributions
(p1 . . . pn) and (q1 . . . qn) if and only if there exist con-
stants C1 . . . Cn and D such that for all i ∈ [1 . . . n],
Ri(p) = D ln p+ Ci. (7)
In the scenario we consider, there is even less freedom.
Aczel’s theorem allows the constants Ci to depend on i.
In the quantum setting, all the Ci must be equal to a
fixed C independent of i (see proof in Appendix A). We
have therefore proved the following:
Theorem 2 (The honest experimentalist). Let A
be a quantum system with dimension n ≥ 3. Let ρ and
σ be density operators for A, and let {|gi〉} be an or-
thonormal basis for A that depends only on σ. Defining
pi = 〈gi| ρ |gi〉 and si = 〈gi|σ |gi〉, suppose that∑
i
piRi(si) ≤
∑
i
piRi(pi) (8)
is satisfied for all ρ and σ, with equality if and only if ρ =
σ. Then {|gi〉} diagonalizes σ, and there exist constants
C and D such that Ri(si) = C +D ln si for all i.
The scheme outlined (HERS) is uniquely specified by
Bob’s need to guarantee Alice’s honesty through self-
interest. Relative entropy, S (ρ‖σ), appears naturally as
the amount of money that Alice can expect to lose by
lying. Any “boss” who wishes never to be lied to must
use the HERS payment scheme.
Of course, rewards in the real world are often struc-
tured less wisely. We propose, however, that a maximally
ethical scientist should act as if she were being motivated
by HERS, and use S (ρ‖σ) as the universal measure of
honesty. Hereafter, we will assume that the experimen-
talist is, in fact, honest.
The Uncertain Experimentalist: What does
“honesty” mean for an experimentalist who is not certain
of ρ? We assert that she should behave as if she were
guided by a tangible, strictly proper, reward scheme.
HERS is an excellent candidate, but our proofs hold for
any strictly proper scheme.
Suppose that Alice does not know ρ, but knows that it
will be selected from an ensemble pi(ρ)dρ (or simply pi(ρ)
hereafter, for clarity). Equivalently, she thinks the true
state is ρ with probability pi(ρ). Her expected reward
(from HERS) for reporting σ is:
R =
∫
R(ρ : σ)pi(ρ)dρ
= C −D
(∫
H(ρ)pi(ρ)dρ+
∫
S (ρ‖σ)pi(ρ)dρ
)
= constσ +D
∫
Tr(ρ lnσ)pi(ρ)dρ
= constσ +D [Tr(ρ lnσ)] = const
′
σ −D [S (ρ‖σ)] ,
3where ρ =
∫
ρpi(ρ)dρ. The “constσ” terms are indepen-
dent of σ and therefore out of Alice’s control. Therefore,
Alice maximizes her honesty by reporting the mean of
her probability distribution.
The uniqueness of HERS depends on the Likelihood
Principle. However, the mean of the probability distri-
bution is maximally honest for any strictly proper scoring
rule:
Theorem 3. Let Alice believe that ρ is selected from a
distribution pi(ρ). Let her expected reward for reporting
σ be R(ρ : σ) =
∑
i piRi(σ), where pi = TrEiρ, and
R(ρ : ρ) > R(ρ : σ) for all σ 6= ρ. Alice maximizes her
expected reward by reporting σ = ρ ≡
∫
ρpi(ρ)dρ.
Proof: Since Alice expects ρ to appear with probabil-
ity pi(ρ), her expected reward is:
R =
∫
R(ρ : σ)pi(ρ)dρ (9)
=
∫ ∑
i
Tr(Eiρ)Ri(σ)pi(ρ)dρ (10)
=
∑
i
TrEi
(∫
ρpi(ρ)dρ
)
Ri(σ) (11)
= R(ρ : σ). (12)
R is strictly proper, so the unique maximum of R(ρ : σ)
is at σ = ρ.
Consider, instead if Alice had tried to maximize fidelity
[15], which is not derived from an operational procedure,
but would guarantee Alice’s honesty when she knows ρ
exactly [32]. Suppose that Alice knows that ρ is either
|0〉〈0| or |+〉〈+|, with equal probability. The fidelity be-
tween any σ and a pure state is F (σ, |ψ〉〈ψ|) = 〈ψ|σ |ψ〉,
so the average fidelity is just:
F = Tr (σρ) , (13)
where ρ = 1
2
(|0〉〈0|+ |+〉〈+|). To maximize F , Alice
would choose the largest eigenstate of ρ – not ρ itself.
Thus, while fidelity appears at first like a good measure
of honesty, it does not generally motivate Alice to report
the mean of her distribution. Moreoever, it can motivate
her to report a pure state that she knows is not the true
state.
This is not simply a different definition of honesty. An
experimentalist who reports a pure state |ψ〉 is predicting
that some event will never occur. If Alice reports |0〉, she
is asserting that no measurement will ever yield |1〉. In
the presence of any uncertainty whatsoever, this is at
best misleading, and at worst an outright lie.
This illustrates that HERS strongly penalizes over-
optimism. If Bob obtains an outcome |fi〉〈fi| for which
〈fi|σ |fi〉 = 0, Alice will lose infinitely much money! A
truly zero-probability event is one against which a gam-
bler would bet infinite money, at arbitrarily bad odds.
Reporting p = 0 for an event that could conceivably hap-
pen is infinitely misleading, and should be discouraged.
The Informed Experimentalist: How should Al-
ice use the results of measurements (that she has per-
formed) to reduce her uncertainty? Suppose that she
has performed POVM measurements on N copies of ρ,
where the ith result corresponds to a positive operator
Ei. She knows two things:
1. ρ is selected at random from an ensemble described
by pi0(ρ).
2. Through experiments on copies of ρ, she
has obtained a measurement record M =
{E1, E2 . . . EN}.
Suppose that she reports σj when Mj occurs, and
is paid according to a SPSR where R(ρ : σ) =∑
i Tr(|fi〉〈fi|ρ)Ri(σ).
Since ρ appears with probability pi0(ρ), the event “ρ
appeared, Mj was measured, and σj was reported” oc-
curs with probability pi0(ρ)p (Mj |ρ). Alice’s expected
reward over all possible events is:
R =
∫ ∑
j
R(ρ : σj)p (Mj |ρ)pi0(ρ)dρ
=
∑
j
∫ (∑
i
Tr(|fi〉〈fi|ρ)Ri(σj)
)
p (Mj|ρ) pi0(ρ)dρ
=
∑
i,j
Tr
[
|fi〉〈fi|
(∫
ρp (Mj |ρ)pi0(ρ)dρ
)]
Ri(σj).
We rewrite this using
pj ≡
∫
p (Mj |ρ)pi0(ρ)dρ, and (14)
ρj ≡
1
pj
∫
ρp (Mj|ρ)pi0(ρ)dρ, (15)
to get
R =
∑
j
pjTr
(
|fi〉〈fi|ρj
)
Ri(σj) =
∑
j
pjR(ρj : σj).
R is strictly proper, so by setting σj = ρj we uniquely
maximize each term in the sum, and Equation 15 defines
the optimal estimate of ρ, given Mj.
Equation 15 is nothing other than Bayes’ Rule. Thus,
the mean of a Bayesian-inferred distribution over states
is the unique optimal estimate – for any strictly proper
reward scheme. We formalize this in the following theo-
rem:
Theorem 4. If ρ is drawn from an ensemble pi0(ρ), and a
measurementMj with conditional probability p (Mj|ρ) is
observed, then every strictly proper scoring rule R(ρ : σ)
is maximized by:
41. Using Bayes’ Rule and Born’s Rule:
pi0(ρ) −→ piM(ρ) =
p(M|ρ)pi0(ρ)∫
dρpi0(ρ)p(M|ρ)
=
[∏N
i=1Tr(Eiρ)
]
pi0(ρ)∫
dρ
[∏N
i=1Tr(Eiρ)pi0(ρ)
] .
2. Reporting the mean of piM(ρ).
This applies not only to relative entropy, our preferred
measure of honesty, but to any honesty-guaranteeing re-
ward scheme. We conclude that Bayesian inference is the
unique solution to honest state estimation.
Other procedures will not optimize any measure of
honesty derived from a strictly proper scoring rule. Alter-
native measures of honesty will either (a) in some circum-
stances, motivate an experimentalist to flat-out lie about
the state, or (b) not be operationally implementable (e.g.,
fidelity). Our previous discussion of fidelity illustrates
that a non-operational metric that guarantees the hon-
esty of a knowledgeable experimentalist can fail dramat-
ically in the face of uncertainty.
Information theorists have previously interpreted rel-
ative entropy as a good measure of two states’ distin-
guishability [16, 17] – indeed, as the only meaningful one
in the limit of many copies. We have invoked the Likeli-
hood Principle rather than the many-copy limit, but we
can easily allow Bob to jointly measure N copies of ρ.
He must then apply a SPSR to the result, and Alice can
expect a reward R(ρ⊗N : σ⊗N ). As N → ∞, relative
entropy remains meaningful, unlike other measures (e.g.,
the Brier score [10]).
In the presence of uncertainty, pure (or rank-deficient)
states are infinitely dishonest estimates. Estimating a
pure state means predicting that some event will never
happen. Anyone taking such a prediction seriously would
be justified in betting infinitely much money, at arbitrar-
ily bad odds, against that event – and should therefore
expect to lose infinitely much, if the estimate is incorrect.
This should be discouraged.
Bayesian state estimation has been discussed previ-
ously [18, 19, 20], especially for pure states [21, 22]. The
predominance of other methods such as maximum likeli-
hoood, in the current literature (e.g., [23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30], indicates that it has not received the attention
it deserves. Our goal in this letter is to provide a concrete
and compelling argument for Bayesian state estimation
– and to call attention to the problematic implications of
pure-state estimates.
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APPENDIX A: FURTHER RESTRICTING THE
REWARD FUNCTION
We show that the quantum reward function is more
tightly constrained than the classical one: the constants
Ci of Theorem 1 must all be equal. We can assume that
D = 1. Assuming a reward function of the form specified
by Theorem 1, the inequality R(ρ : σ) ≤ R(ρ : ρ) is then
equivalent to
S (ρ‖σ) +
∑
i
Ci(ri − pi) ≥ 0. (A1)
Let U(t) be a smooth curve in the unitary group defined
on a neighborhood of t = 0 and such that U(0) = I. Also
let σ(t) = U(t)ρU †(t) and
g(t) = S (ρ‖σ(t)) +
∑
i
Ci
[
ri − Tr
(
ρU(t)|ei〉〈ei|U
†(t)
)]
be the function defined by substituting σ(t) into the ex-
pression of Eq. (A1). (Here ρ =
∑
i ri|ei〉〈ei|, so that
|fi〉 = U |ei〉.) Differentiating gives
d
dt
S (ρ‖σ(t)) = −Tr
[
ρ
(
U˙(ln ρ)U † + U(ln ρ)U˙ †
)]
, (A2)
where U˙ = dU/dt and the dependence of U on t has
been suppressed. Because U˙ + U˙ † = 0 when t = 0,
d
dt
S (ρ‖σ(t)) |t=0 = 0. Likewise, p˙i equals 0 when t = 0.
We must therefore determine the second derivative of
g at t = 0 and show that for a suitable choice of
curve, this derivative is negative. In that case, g(t) =
g(0)+ g¨(0)t2/2+O(t3) with g¨(0) < 0, implying that g(t)
is negative for sufficiently small t.
So, differentiating again, we find
d2
dt2
S (ρ‖σ(t))
∣∣∣
t=0
= 2Tr
[
[X, ρ](ln ρ)X
]
, (A3)
where X is a Hermitian matrix such that U˙ = iX . We
have made use of the identity U¨ + U¨ † = −2U˙U˙ † that
can be proved by differentiating UU † = I. Because
S (ρ‖σ(t)) ≥ 0, the expression in Eq. (A3) must also be
nonnegative.
Differentiating the second term of g(t), we find that
d2g
dt2
∣∣∣
t=0
= 2Tr
[
[X, ρ](ln ρ+B)X
]
, (A4)
where B =
∑
i Ci|ei〉〈ei|.
We will now show that all the Ci must be equal. As-
sume without loss of generality that C1 6= C2. Let
rj = exp(−(Cj+2 ln 2)/2) for j = 1, 2 and r3 = 1−r1−r2.
5With these choices, r1, r2 ≤ 1/2, making ρ a density op-
erator. Now write ρ˜ and B˜ for the restriction of ρ and
B to the span of the first two eigenvectors of ρ. Observe
that there exists a choice of X also with support only on
this subspace such that Tr
[
[X, ρ˜](ln ρ˜)X
]
> 0.
With these choices, and noting that Tr
[
[X, ρ˜]X
]
= 0,
g¨(0) = −2Tr
[
[X, ρ˜](ln ρ˜)X
]
< 0. (A5)
Because g¨(0) < 0 contradicts the requirement that
D(ρ‖σ(t)) ≥ 0, we conclude that Ci = C1 for all i.
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